Barrett's the illusion of technique by Fleming, Richard
BARRETT'S THE ILLUSION OF TECHNIQUE 
Richard Fleming 
William Barrett: The Illusion of Technique. Pp. xx + 
359. Garden City: Anchor PressTDoubleday, 1978. 
Cloth, $12.95. 
Solzhenitsyn, Skinner and freedom of the will: 
these are the people and the problem with which William 
Barrett begins and ends The Illusion of Technique. It 
might seem that Solzhenitsyn and Skinner are a rather 
odd pair upon whom to base a discussion of the problem 
of freedom of the will. For Barrett, however, there are 
no two better contemporaries around whom to develop his 
primary thesis that freedom can and in fact must be made 
real in a society of extreme technology. While Skinner 
is a writer in the relatively free United States, he 
nonetheless expounds the virtues of total social control 
and conditioning; whereas Solzhenitsyn, a writer from 
the totalitarian Soviet Union, argues for the absolute 
spiritual freedom of human beings. "Clearly," notes 
Barrett, "we live in a strange time." Now it might seem 
that an equivocation has taken place on the word 
"freedom," for clearly Skinner speaks of a political 
freedom while Solzhenitsyn has in mind philosophical 
freedom. But this is just the point that Barrett wishes 
to make, namely that the two types of freedom must 
finally collapse into one notion. Our views of political 
freedom, he claims, directly influence our views of 
philosophical freedom and vice versa. It is with that 
belief that Barrett proceeds to investigate the nature 
of technique and the importance of human freedom for our 
contemporary world. The great danger in our century, 
according to Barrett, is that whereas "[f]ormerly deter-
minists argued for a metaphysical realjity that remained 
invisible behind the scenes; in our century they have 
not only brought it onto the scene, but also made it 
dominate the action, as they seek to shape society by 
its light." 
While this book has faults, which I discuss below, 
it still is to be applauded for one key aspect. It, 
like Carl Sagan's The Dragons of Eden, attempts to re-
turn our thoughts concerning the nature of science and 
intellectual endeavors away from the technological side, 
which has predominated our thought for the last fifty 
years, and place it more in accord with theology and 
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the search for final ends, which has been emphasized 
historically. Like Sagan, Barrett sees much of the 
contemporary view of science as overemphasizing tech-
nology and often directly identifying science with 
technology, in so doing forgetting the important role 
that the search for final rather than immediate ends 
plays in the advancement of science and intellectual 
thought in general. 
Barrett's approach to the problem of technology 
and freedom is first to investigate what he takes to be 
the ideal par excellence of technique in this century, 
namely symbolic logic, and to show the limitations and 
failure of that ideal. He accomplishes this by con-
trasting the ideal language approach exemplified in 
Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus with the latter Wittgenstein 
and his attempt to open up the restrictions that have 
traditionally been placed on the nature and role of 
language. From there Barrett moves to Heidegger and his 
improvement on the later Wittgenstein; an improvement, 
he claims, in the sense that language only confronts us 
within "Being" and thus "Being" .is more fundamental and 
important for intellectual investigation than language. 
However, as Heidegger stresses, "Being" just is and 
nothing more can be expected of it. Thus while it may 
encompass all, it is only understood or exemplified 
through action. This latter exphasis leads Barrett to 
the pragmatism of William James where he concludes that 
the problem of freedom is one which ultimately is dia-
lectically inconclusive and that—because determinism 
lacks a rigorous logical demonstration and proves to be 
non-falsifiable--humans have the right to believe that 
they are free. To paraphrase James "my first act of 
freedom is to believe in freedom." 
The problems with Barrett's book are numerous. 
His extreme dislike for Russell and Sartre make his com-
ments on these two philosophers often useless. For 
instance, on Russell's continual shifting of positions 
on the nature of the external world, Barrett holds "Here 
philosophy has become a playful exercise. This is the 
higher frivolousness carried out with aristocratic 
panache. Lord Russell indeed!" Of Sartre on freedom 
he days, "I cannot read Sartre on freedom without 
sensing the ghost of Buridan's donkey hovering in the 
wings." But then again similar comments made of others 
are not only amusing but somehow enlightening. When 
discussing Skinner's ardent campagning for his ideal 
community, Barrett remarks, "One feels that Professor 
Skinner might have made a great career for himself in 
advertising or public relations." 
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Other problems are more disturbing. His strange 
branding of the later Wittgenstein as a behaviorist 
stands in direct contrast to his wish to show how the 
latter tries to release us from a narrow picture of how 
words and world relate, to say nothing of Wittgenstein's 
own proclamations. "'Are you not really a behaviourist 
in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that 
everything except human behaviour is a fiction?'—If I 
do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical 
fiction." Even stranger is his treatment of Heidegger's 
Naziism. After having criticized Descartes and Husserl 
for ignoring the concrete aspects of existence he claims 
we can "look past such accidents of personality and 
history" as Heidegger's adhesion to Naziism. But then 
only four pages later he attempts to explain these 
"accidents of personality and history" by Heidegger's 
love for his homeland and the "strong appeal to regional 
feelings" made by the nationalist party. Such explana-
tions merely leave one wondering why he bothers to 
mention the relationship at all. 
Another minor problem I see with the book is 
Barrett's inability to put into words a desire he ex-
presses implicitly throughout the book. That desire is 
the wish to find some common aspect in contemporary in-
tellectual fields that will explain their natures and 
tie them more closely together. Numerous references to 
this can be found. "We live in our own atonal world." 
On "science-technology": "what is the force of the 
hyphen here? Is it only an accidental coupling, or does 
it signify some more essential bond between the two 
terms it unites?" "The belief in the decisive role of 
technique has not vanished; it has passed from the 
philosophers into the culture at large." What is it 
that underlies the contemporary movements in the arts 
and sciences and culture at large? Is it a belief in 
the value of technique or is it such that certain areas 
of study, such as quantum mechanics, positivism, and 
atonal music have different conceptions of rationality 
than many of their counterparts? Barrett provides little 
help here. 
The major problem with this book, however, is 
Barrett's misunderstanding of the linguistic turn as 
initiated by Wittgenstein. This is exemplified in his 
claim that language is only to be found within "Being" 
and "that language itself is not understandable apart 
from Being." Language is seen by Barrett as a communi-
cative set of conventions that are adopted to help us 
understand nature. "[W]e might, for example, decide to 
change our mathematical conventions and drop the notion 
of irrational numbers altogether. After all, they have 
been a troublesome part of mathematics, and no alto-
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gether satisfactory theory of them has yet been worked 
out. But the diameter of the square would still be there 
to be measured. And it is this need to deal with nature 
that ultimately takes the measure of our various con-
ventions—mathematical and others." What is missed here 
is Wittgenstein's later conception of language. Barrett 
presupposes the very model of language that Wittgenstein 
argued was too narrow. Language, for the later Wittgen-
stein, was not to be conceived as something which is 
subsquently added to pre-existing objects. It is not 
as though language and the world were independent enti-
ties, but that we come to the world through language 
itself. We are to unite linguistic signs, objects and 
human activities into one notion and treat them as de-
pendent rather than independent entities. 
Simply to look upon Wittgenstein as introducing in 
the "linquistic turn" as another choice of how one might 
choose to proceed intellectually, is as superficial as 
simply saying that Kant introduces a "Copernican turn." 
For it is not that Kant simply moves from an emphasis 
on "being" to an emphasis on consciousness—as if we had 
an option—but that what is involved for Kant is a whole 
new philosophical orientation. That is, he stressed a 
radically different notion of objectivity than that which 
had preceded him. Similarly Wittgenstein exemplifies, 
indeed, a linguistic turn. But it is much more than 
simply beginning with language rather than being or 
consciousness. It is not as if we have a choice. We 
begin where we are and where we find ourselves, and 
that for Wittgenstein is in the milieu of the "forms of 
life," modes of activity which involve intentional 
actions, in accord with rules or norms, directed to 
purposeful ends. These activities are divisible into 
language-games which are, for Wittgenstein, the most 
general way to characterize the relationship of word 
and world. Language-games are to be thought of as 
fluid, dynamic and evolutionary, where the constitutive 
rules of a particular activity are the key to interpre-
tation, meaning and objectivity. That is, in order to 
engage in any rational activity, the constitutive rules 
of the language-game are importantly involved. It is 
this radical shift in viewing the relationship of words 
and world that Barrett misses in the later Wittgenstein. 
Thus very much like his previous book Irrational 
Man, Barrett's The Illusion of Technique is most en-
lightening when he puts forward his own views and much 
less so when he is interpreting the positions of others. 
Fortunately much of his new book consists of the former 
and is therefore well worth the difficulties encountered 
with the latter. 
